Several years ago, during my PhD, I had the opportunity to study Goethe’s theory of the imagination in the writings of Henri Bortoft.1 Bortoft read Goethe as a precursor of phenomenology with his theory of organic form.2 To put it briefly: For Goethe, the imagination was the organ of perception enabling one to grasp the “aliveness” of things, so that by being able to unfold them backwards and forwards in time, one would eventually be able to witness a whole undergoing differentiation by spawning related parts. Crucial to claiming Goethe as a phenomenologist was the notion that the imagination was, in fact, an organ of perception so that the whole that it allowed one to behold was not merely in the eye of the beholder but disclosed the aliveness of the thing itself.
For many years, while reading Newman—in the Idea, in his Oxford sermons, in the Grammar, in the Essay on Development—I kept getting a similar flavor, but somehow could not locate a point of contact between Newman’s philosophical sources (Aristotle, British empiricism, patristics) and the Romantic mood to which Goethe belonged. I could not, that is, until perusing Edward Sillem’s edition of Newman’s Philosophical Notebook. There, he recounts how Newman
possessed [the two-volume] edition of [Abraham Tucker’s] work, now in the main library of the Oratory. Judging from the few pencil markings in the first volume, he had read those parts of the work which concern the theory of the acquisition of knowledge in experience.3
In assessing the specific contribution of Tucker to Newman’s intellectual genealogy, Sillem relies heavily on Walter Jackson Bate’s work, From Classic to Romantic: Premises of Taste in Eighteenth-Century England.4 In that book, Bate traces the transition from classical to Romantic theories of taste and places the doctrine of associationism—one that traces back to Hume’s empiricism—at the heart of the transition. According to Bate,
Its ultimate conclusion in Hume that the mind can know only its own isolated ideas, with no absolute confidence in the existence and nature either of the external world or of the rational validity of the mind’s working, empiricism was to become a primary support to romantic criticism—as well as the basis for nineteenth- and twentieth-century relativistic criticism in general—and was to assist it in the establishment of a more subjective and emotional conception of taste.5
Like in the telephone game, where people whisper the same word to each other and what comes up at the end is usually quite unlike what came in, associationism went from being a skeptical doctrine for Hume (whereby beauty is merely an effect of associations of ideas by the beholder and not a property of the object) to being closer—with Abraham Tucker—to what I would call a “semiotic realist” view. Namely, the view that some form of mediation allows the object to disclose itself to the beholder. This latter version is the one that seems to me best to resemble the version of associationism propounded by Tucker. Indeed, in his seven-volume work, The Light of Nature Pursued (which was to know several abridgments after its original publication), Tucker stressed how ideas do not just “associate” between themselves, but essentially “coalesce” into a synthetic whole, such that “the subjectively creative function of association also possesses a valid insight into the total nature of its object.”6
Based on these initial considerations, it would seem that the connection with Tucker’s work could justify a more direct connection between Newman and the Romantic inclination to grant a broader range of human faculties access to knowledge of reality. Bate is also perceptive to relate Tucker’s theory of coalescence to Gestalt psychology, whereby original experience always has a Gestalt, all-at-once quality to it, as when a deaf-mute Helen Keller realizes for the first time that the “cool something” wetting her palm could actually be called “water.”7 First-time encounters are always disclosive, and they feel immediate.
As a counterweight to this feeling of unreflective immediacy, however, Newman builds into his account a permanent possibility of after-the-fact scrutiny that adds an original piece to Tucker’s model. In Newman’s theory of the illative sense there is a crucial gap between inference and assent: this opens up an enduring possibility to exercise critical scrutiny vis-à-vis the wholes one perceives, by leaning on evaluative criteria issued from a “community of informed judgment,” as Aquino observes in his monograph with the same title.8 The gap between inference and assent, therefore, crafts a welcome corrective against solipsistic outcomes. In this sense, by positing a theory of wholes as mediations of reality by the imagination—taken as an organ of perception—it seems that Newman not only participates, via Tucker, in a Romantic aesthetic, but also does so in a way that makes it possible to preserve reference to the outside world and to social criteria for the validation of knowledge—holding fast to a realist commitment.
1 Henri Bortoft, The Wholeness of Nature: Goethe’s Way Toward a Science of Conscious Participation in Nature (Lindisfarne Books, 1996).
2 Henri Bortoft, Taking Appearance Seriously: The Dynamic Way of Seeing in Goethe and European Thought (Floris Books, 2012).
3 Newman, The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman, ed. Edward J. Sillem(Nauwelaerts, 1969), 1:210.
4 Walter Jackson Bate, From Classic to Romantic: Premises of Taste in Eighteenth-Century England (Harvard University Press, 1946).
5 Bate, From Classic to Romantic, 56.
6 Bate, From Classic to Romantic, 118.
7 Helen Keller, The Story of My Life (Bantam Classics, 1990).
8 Frederick D. Aquino, Communities of Informed Judgment: Newman’s Illative Sense and Accounts of Rationality (Catholic University of America Press, 2004).
Luigi was a Visiting Scholar at NINS during September 2023. He is Assistant Professor (Maître de Conférences) of Education at the Catholic University of the West in Angers, France. He is also a member of the scientific committee of the "John Henry Newman" Chair at the Catholic University of Ávila (Spain).
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